Bad Faith, Responsibility and Freedom.

Oli, you said that, ‘we must also justify our actions in the face of the reality that we can seek support from nowhere else but ourselves.’ Solomon (2006, p.146) reaffirms this observation by saying, “The bottom line, however, is that self-deception is not primarily a matter of beliefs, much less contradictory beliefs. It is not (literally) a matter of self-deception. It is, rather, a question of taking responsibility.” Can we ever take full reasonability if we are located in a realm of bad faith? If we do not take into account our past and our full potential we are not showing ourselves full respect, therefore we are not being responsible in allowing ourselves to have the best life possible. Sartre says, “Bad faith seeks to affirm their identity while preserving their differences.” (p.56). Heter (2006, p. 63) states, “The concept of bad faith is parasitic on Sartre's concept of human freedom. I define bad faith as a lived misrecognition of one's own freedom. Bad faith is 'lived' in the sense that it is expressed through actions, as well as beliefs and attitudes.” It seems then that to not be in bad faith, we must truthfully acknowledge our past, recognise our potential, make the correct judgements and give meaning to what we do all at the same time. This brings me back to your point Oli, in that we can only examine our actions and cross reference them with ourselves once we have carried them out. Heter (2006, p.64) goes on to say, “Just as one can fail to recognize the freedom of others by disrespecting them, one can fail to recognize one's own freedom by disrespecting one's self.” But is this a modern interpretation of freedom. To be responsible, to acknowledge our past and to reach out for our true potential, is that the concept of freedom today? Somewhere deep inside each one of us there is an empty space, what Sartre calls Néant, or nothingness, which no one and no thing can touch. That place is freedom, for in it I can give the events of my life any meaning I choose. (Alford, 2005, p.56). So for Sartre the women was acting in bath faith because she was reduced the action of leaving her hand there and being nothing, we only have Sartre to thank for providing us with the narrative of meaning. As I have said before both have negative meanings. The true meaning would have been locked deep inside.

The Language of ‘I’.

You seem to have considered the language used by Sartre in some depth and I have to agree with your point Helen that we only hear the voice of Sartre and not of the women in question. Solomon highlights the importance of language by saying:
Many philosophers, linguists, and social scientists would say that self consciousness is the product of language, and not just any language, but a special self-referring language. There must be first-person pronouns in some sense [...]. There must be not only some sense of self but also some conception of self, and this does indeed require language. (Solomon, 2006,p.140).
The whole point of the example is to show that the woman is acting in bad faith. But we are only told of her actions and her supposed consciousness through Sartre’s narration (he does not allow the man and women to become actors with dialogue, but keeps them trapped as mere characters). Not just the actions and thoughts of the women suggest a lack of ownership but the entire piece of writing itself. “She does not even give it a name” (Sartre, p.55). I understand that Sartre is saying the she does not acknowledge what is happening before her, and by not naming it she does not acknowledge that it is happening to her. But as I sit here and type this I am experiencing a terrible feeling of dread. Sartre, as the real man in this story, has ensured he holds all the power from the start. By not allowing us to hear the voices of his characters, especially the women, he has entrapped her never allowing her the possibility to escape her bad faith. “I have a choice to as to how to react about everything that happens to me, and how to come to terms with it.” (Alford, 2005, p.55). Sartre does provide us, the reader, with outcomes as to what will happen if the woman was to either keep her hand there or remove it. Both options presented, however, only provide us with bad outcomes; the reason why there are only bad outcomes Sartre suggests is because she is ‘all intellect’. Hence creating an act of disembodiment, during which time she goes on to talk about her life. This is the nearest we get to almost hearing her say the word, ‘I’. As I stated at the beginning, the use of such language would create her own self-consciousness. Thus acknowledging an awareness of who she is, and not just her essence, something that would seem so important to her, it culminates in an almost out-of-body experience. But this again allows Sartre to focus back to her hand. So we no longer hear her talk, or even think for that matter. She has once again been bereft of language, the ability to say the word ‘I’.

We can edit out what we want in the next few weeks. I think having far too much is better than not having enough. Besides, as long as there is ample contribution from us all, then we can pick the best bits and structure a dialogue that is cohesive from it.

Anyway, whilst reading Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Sense and Non-Sense I have come across the best explanation of Sartre's ontology in Being and Nothingness that I have yet encountered. It is very easy to understand I think.

After this, I think I have said my point. I stand in defence of his Philosophy.

"...Sartre thinks that liberty is exactly nothing - but a nothing which is everything. It is like a curse and at the same time the source of all human grandeur. It is indivisibly the principle of chaos and the principle of human order. If, in order to be subject, the subject must cut himself off from the order of things, man will have no 'state of consciousness', no 'feeling' which is not part of his consuming freedom and which is purely and simply what it is, the way things are. From this follows an analysis of ways of behaving which shows them all to be ambiguous. Bad faith and inauthenticity are essential to man because they are inscribed in the intentional structure of consciousness which is presence both to itself and to things. The very will to be good makes goodness false, since it directs us toward ourselves at the moment we should be directed toward the other" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p.74). Furthermore, "The principles of good and evil are therefore but one principle. Man wretchedness can be seen in his grandeur and his grandeur in his wretchedness. Sartre's philosophy, wrote another critic, 'starts by putting out the light of the spirit'. Quite the contrary: it makes it shine everywhere because we are not body and spirit or consciousness confronting the world but spirit incarnate, being in the world" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, pp.74-75).

I think that the last exert helps also in some way to defend Sartre's philosophy against certain moral criticisms which could be aimed his way. For example, it defends it against the critique that stipulates that if we embrace a philosophy that tells us we have no obligation to our past, or indeed to who we are to be in the future, and only to recreate ourselves in the moment of constant flux, then we have no obligation to the moral goodness of the 'who-we-are'. Sartre's philosophy contests that this 'who-we-are' is itself an act of bad faith, and a projection of of the static into the transient flux. In our constant recreation of ourselves, we are the masters of our destiny. We must only justify our actions to ourselves, not to the external world (including a deity external to ourselves). However, in such self justification, we must also justify our actions in the face of the reality that we can seek support from nowhere else but ourselves. There is no get out clause. And, in addition, when we fashion ourselves, we fashion the world, and in doing so we must also justify this to ourselves. I find it a moral principle not dissimilar to Kant's categorical imperative.

"In morality as in art there is no solution for the man who will not make a move without knowing where he is going and who wants to be accurate and in control at every moment. Our only resort is the spontaneous moment which binds us to others for good or ill, out of selfishness or generosity" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p.4). Sartre's ontology in Being and Nothingness exhibits the fundamental importance of the importance of the philosophical emphasis of this spoantaneous moment.

...

Hey guys, we can edit this out.

We appear to be excelling the word limit at light speed. So I'm going to give a real short answer to your blog Pete -- then launch in there with some Sartre criticisms -- De'beauvoir I think. There's quite a lot of material there. If either of you need to send me any extra notes regarding the previous lec, email me: helen_calcutt@hotmail.com.

X

Language problems...

Firstly, in response to you Oli.

I agree with you when you say, that language does not undermine Sartre's work in its philosophical validity.
'Thought', can be elaborated in the language used to express it. Here I am taking the Neo-Classic approach that language is the 'dress' of thought. And that such language can be used to express any given thought, but without any intrinsic change by the 'procedures of style'. (The Art of Poetry: Pg 52)

However there is a great power in discourse, in particular as you have said, in the way that Foucault would contend. Discourse is not simply the language used, or the words spoken. But also how this language and these words are received; how they work in a social reception. The validity of a given argument, can further depend on how it is received. How it is discussed or debated, can rest on how 'it' has thus been articulated in the first place.
Most importantly, the meaning that is further extracted can also depend on language, and how this language has been used to convey an idea. (I must point out here that 'meaning' is by no means fixed. Meaning by its very nature fluxes. But with regards to any given philosophical theory, the meaning assigned by the philosopher is crucial to the inter-workings of their theory?)
This is where I think Sartre stumbles. Perhaps he didn't mean to debase women, students, waiters etc. But the ways in which he has articulated his examples, have given rise to such responses, especially from the voices of feminism. Yes, the intrinsic thought does not change. But this thought or idea can be expressed under various guises. The ways in which Sartre chose to articulate his theories, were perhaps not the best therefore. And this is rather a huge failing on his part. Language is essential to the communication of thought. Does the thought exist for any 'other' if it is not either spoken, or written down? The idea, to be taken in the way it was meant to be recieved, thus rests heavily on the form in which it is externalised.
You say Oli, that 'we should be careful no to appropriate meaning to terms because of the commonsense applicability which encapsulates them'. However in various instances the terms used by Sartre are simply nonsensical:
“What must be the being of man if he is to be capable of bad faith?”/ Take the example of a woman... '( Sartre Pg 55). This, is not so much a word game ( as I admit can be taken with your example of the waiter 'playing with his condition'.) This is more a failing of words on the grounds of terminology.
Sartre's theory as a whole however, does not fall down on its expression. But it is important to acknowledge how his choice of wording at times, has led him to such criticism. While this can be seen as 'nit -picking', it is of importance, because Sartre does either one of two things. He either firstly, undermines the validity and power of language by using it so carelessly.
Or secondly, 'writes as if he could speak of the conscious life of those in his stories, by the same right as he projects his own consciousness of a situation'. (Genre and Void. Pg xxvii) If the second, Sartre 'speaks as if for the whole world. (Genre and Void. Pg xxvii)'. It can be argued then, that Sartre not only undermines, but also speaks for others. Whether this is the case or not however, is debateable.

Help with the transience of being...

I think that these two writers help to sum up what I am continually trying to say about transient flux:

"...from beginning to end, the philosophical thought of Sartre maintains a remarkable unity and permanence throughout all his works: this permanence is displayed by his repeated affirmation that consciousness is not a thing, that the distinctive feature of human reality is to always surpass itself towards its end, and therefore that it cannot be reduced to the level of determinism" (Audry 1955, in Lafarge, 1970, p.170).

In addition,

"We make ourselves what we are, in terms of a chosen end and according to a project which is always surpassing of the given. In other words, man "is only to the extent that he exists and he exists only by projecting himself toward, he is only by being elsewhere, outside-of-himself-in-the-world, he is, in a sense, this impossibility of being oneself. I am never in myself, I have no consistency of being within me, I exist only in my relation to the world" (Jeanson, 1952, p.75). And thus, according to Sartre, there is no such thing as human nature; only our freedom exists" (Lafarge, 1970, pp.170-171).

The understanding of tranisent flux

Peter, I am inclined to comment that you have, although not entirely, misunderstood the concept of what I meant by my interpretation of why the woman in the cafe is acting in bad faith. I say that in positing a certain idea of what it would be to be sincere to 'herself', and in doing so establishing a static conception of self that renegades against the transient nature of her being, the woman is acting in bad faith. In contemplating such a hypothetical instance, it is unimportant what either the man or the woman expect will happen at the culmination of the meeting, and likewise it is unimportant as to whether their wants, desires and expectations will change over time (although this can be taken as highly likely). For instance, your example of the fact that the man thinks that they will end up in bed together because of inherent chauvinist characteristics is irrelevant. The act of bad faith on the woman's part is in its totality conditional of her understanding of herself as a particular 'type' of individual with a particular 'set' of character traits and inclinations. Sartre exemplifies this when he writes "She draws her companion up to the most lofty regions of sentimental speculation; she speaks of Life, of her life, she shows herself in her essential aspect-a personality, a consciousness" (1993, p.56). It is her showing of her essential self as a personality of particular categorization that is key here. As I have previously contended, the woman is projecting a static ideal of her self onto the transient flux of her being. This qualifies as bad faith because it "seeks to affirm... identity while preserving... differences" (Sartre, 1993, p.56). Furthermore, it affirms "facticity as being transcendence and transcendence as being facticity" (Sartre, 1993, p.56). In other words (and in line with my earlier identification of the key terms of Sartre's ontology), the woman posits all that she has been as intrinsic to the possibilities of everything she can be, and subsequently appropriates her possibilities as fundamentally conditional upon all that she has been.

Sexist Sartre?

Helen, in previous correspondence concerning criticism of Sartre by Le Doueff, you have mentioned to me that she argues that Sartre's philosophy lacks basis because of inherent sexism and a 'superiority complex' exhibited in the examples he uses to justify his understanding of acting in bad faith. Both of the apparent unfortunate weaknesses of Sartre's outlook can in some way be identified in his example of the woman in the cafe that we discuss. However, I do not believe that such an attack by Le Doueff is particularly useful in trying to undermine Sartre's work in its philosophical validity. It is true that the language exhibited by Sartre does at times unfortunately embody the character of sexist language. Sartre does sometimes talk of the woman as if she is beneath him, as he does with the case of the waiter who, in his role of service to others, is "playing, amusing himself" (Sartre, 1993, p.59). It is true that at first glance this sentence is demeaning, as if Sartre believes he is superior to this 'poor and unfortunate' waiter who's occupation is so monotonous that he must play games with his own imagination and act out roles to pass the time whilst at work. I also agree with what you have said to me in correspondence Helen, in that language is indeed a powerful communicative tool, particularly, as you have mentioned, in the way that Foucault would contest. However, and this is important, I think that the sense of superiority that Le Doueff attempts to identify is not exactly what she conceived. We can point to Sartre elaborating on what he means when he says that the waiter plays. He writes "the waiter in the cafe plays with his condition in order to realize it" (1993, p.59). We should be careful not to appropriate meaning to terms because of the commonsense applicability that encapsulates them. To play is not always to engage in the trivial. This can be understood when we look at Wittgenstein's understanding of how we play language games. It is not a loosely conceived term intended to exhibit casual and uncomplicated phenomena. To play is to engage oneself in this sense. I am sure Sartre would agree that he too was playing the role of the philosopher when he engaged in critical analysis of his ontological outlook, and in doing so he too was playing with his condition in order to realize it. In addition, apart from perhaps proving that Sartre may have indeed been sexist and viewed women as subordinate, what does this discovery of Le Doueff actually contain that effectively refutes Sartre's philosophy 'in-itself'? She may have concluded that Sartre understood women as "beings-to-be-referred-to-by-their-sexual-existence-alone" (Le Doueff, 1991, p.61), but that in itself does not detract from Sartre's philosophy as a valid ontology.